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THE FOG CATCHERS: THE RISE OF PROPERTY
BEYOND THE COST-BENEFIT APPROACH
GUILLERMO ARRIBAS IRAZOLA*
ABSTRACT
Scarcity of natural resources has made resource management a key element
for societies' development. In the human-natural resources relationship we will
find open access, limited open access, exclusionary rights, and excess of exclusionary rights. Within the law, each of these stages has been studied under the
umbrella of property law, with law and economics as the long-standing driver of
legal academy in the United States.
This Article contests one of the main foundations of this trend in property
theory, which claims that private property is mainly a product of rational efficiency reasoning, based on a cost-benefit analysis. To demonstrate this, the Article examines the management of land and water in a shantytown located in the
outskirts of Lima, the capital of Peru. The residents of the shantytown are principally urban aboriginals from the Peruvian highlands, there is no State presence, nor existence of water grids. The case reveals that land management partially follows the typical cost-benefit story of property creation, while fog farming
does not at all. There are no legal property rights over land, and residents prefer
to keep buying expensive water from third parties instead of engaging in fog
farming. A close study of this case illuminates the creation and interaction of
social norms and legal property rules, giving a perspective mostly overlooked in
property talk. This Article will examine how the inability of transforming social
property norns into legal property rights may potentially underscore urban aboriginals, being a gridlock for poverty and social segregation.
The Fog Catchers case reflects a stage that has been titled "contested access," reflecting a unique tension between social norms and the legal system in
"third world" countries. However, this Article also draws parallels to comparable stories in developed countries, such as the United States, Germany, and
Australia, showing that contested access, like any property tragedy, can be everywhere.

* Mr. Arribas graduated from Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru-PUCP (2013, J.D. equivalent), and has a Master of Laws (LL.M.) from Yale Law School (2017). Mr. Arribas is a professor of law at PUCP, where he has taught Property, Contracts and Legal Skills, and is currently
working as a visiting lawyer in the New York office of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. The author
wishes to thank to George Priest, Carol Rose, Claire Priest, Robert Ellickson, Richard Epstein,
for their comments, and to Carlos Socola for his valuable research assistance. The research of
this article was possible thanks to the Kauffman Fellowship at Yale Law School.

237

WA TER LA WREVIEW

238

Volume 21

Introduction ................................................................................................
238
I. The Rise of Property and the Cost-Benefit Approach............................242
II. The Fog Catchers Case: Villa Lourdes..................................................245
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Background of the Case Study
....................
..... 245
Shantytowns in Lima
.............................
246
Villa Lourdes
..........................
.........
249
The Fog Catchers as an Alternative for Having Water..............251
The Fog Catchers in Villa Lourdes
..............
..... 252
Private Parties Involved
...........................
255
1. The Residents of Villa Lourdes .....................
255
2. Peruanos Sin Agua ............................
256
G. State Role ...........................
..........
256
H. Summary: Resources Involved and Their Current Treatment..257
1. Land
.............................
............. ............. 257
2. Water
......................................................
258
III. Why is the Cost-Benefit Approach Insufficient to Explain the Fog
Catchers Case?...............................................................................258
IV. Beyond a Cost-Benefit Approach in Property- Of Internal and External
Factors............................................................................................259
A. Land and External Factors.
....................
..... 260
B. Fog and Internal Factors.................
............... 261
V. Aboriginals and the "Third World": A Non-Exclusive Story of Legal

Pluralism
Conclusion

..........

..... ........................

......................... 262

........................................................................

264

INTRODUCTION

We live in a limited world, with limited natural resources for survival. Scarcity has surrounded us since the dawn of time. Hence, the relation between
humans and natural resources has been a key element for the development of
our species. Within the human-natural resources spectrum we will find open
access, limited open access, exclusionary rights, and excess of exclusionary
rights. Blurred lines divide these categories, having many different middle
points along the spectrum.
The relationship between humans and natural resources has always puzzled
scholars of different disciplines. Such is the case of the ecologist Garrett Hardin, who wrote his fanous 1968 article on the tragedy of the commons.' He
considered that any case of open access will end with the depredation of such
resource.' According to Hardin, "IfIreedom in a conunons brings ruin to all."'
He did not differentiate between broad open access, where anyone in the world
is able to benefit from the resource, and limited open access, which may be
restricted to the communal use of a determined group.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Garrett Hardin, The 7gcdyofthe Conunons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968).
Id. at 1243-45.
Id. at 1244.
See id.
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Economists have had their share too. Ronald Coase's 1960 article "The
Problem of the Social Cost," for which he later won the Nobel Prize in Economics, together with Harold Demsetz' 1967 piece "Toward a Theory of Property Rights,"" has shaped and driven the discussion on exclusionary rights, the
essence of private property. Elinor Ostrom's 1990 book Governingthe Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, for which she also
won the Nobel Prize in Economics, led the analysis in what Hardin, Coase, and
Demsetz did not see: limited open access.
Within the law, the human-natural resources spectrtum is analyzed under
the umbrella of property law. Hardin, Coase, Demsetz, and Ostrom influenced
legal thought with their ideas, and they have been widely discussed by property
scholars. Robert Ellickson," Carol Rose,' Richard Posner," Richard Epstein,
Henry Smith," Thomas Merrill," and Michael Heller," among others, have reframed and discussed the tragedy of the commons and property.
The discussion of property in law has been driven by law and economics,
7
principally inspired by Demsetz' 1967 "Toward a Theory of Property Rights."
Demsetz proposed an explanation for what causes exclusionary rights to exist
or, in other words, why private property is created. In a nutshell, he proposes
that private property will appear when benefits of excluding third parties are
higher than costs, eliminating through private property the externalities caused

5.
6.
7.

Ronald Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost 3J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
Harold.Demsetz, Toward a TheoiyofPropemnrv1ihts, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).

ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EvOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).

See, e.g, id. at 23.
See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, 2-3, 13 (1989); see also
Terry Anderson & PJ. Hill, The Evolution ofProperty Khts: A Studv of the Amenean West,
18J. L. & EcoN. 163, 164-68 (1975) (noting that these works in property have also been remarkable contributions from economists to property law).
10. See, e.g., ROBERT ELLUCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DIsPITEs, at i, 1-5 (1994) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER].
8.

9.

11. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Swpjising Commons, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1258-60, 1262,
1269, 1274 (2014).
12. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 27-29 (2nd ed. 1977).
13. See, e.g, Richard A. Epstein, PropertyRghtsand Governance Strategies:How Best to
Deal iwith Land, Water, IntellectualProperty,andSpectrum, 14 COLO. TECH. LJ. 181,183-84,

186-89, 217-18 (2016).
14. See, e.g., Heny E. Smith, Evelusion Versus Governance: Two Strategiesfor Dehncatug
Properyights, 31J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S457-58, S478-82, S486 (2002).
15.

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Propertyand the 1tht to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,

730-31, 733, 750 (1998).
16.

Michael Heller, The Tiagedy of the Anticominmons: Propertv Lu the Transition fiom

Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 622, 624-26 (1998).
17. Sce James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Orgins of Property 1ights, 95
CORNELL L. REv. 139, 139-50 (2009); Taisu Zhang, Cuhura/Paradigmsin PropertyInstitutions,
41 YALE.J. INT'L L. 347, 355-66 (2016).
18. Demsetz, supra note 6, at 347-53.
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by having open access." Through private property, Demsetz explains, we elimmate common-pool losses.' Using Hardin's catchy label, Demsetz proposes
that private property is the cure for the "tragedy of the commons.""
Since Demsetz, scholarship has evolved. A variety of scholars have sug-.
gested the concept of limited open access, 2 the space for private ordering without the intervention of the government,' and the relativity of private property as
the sole and best remedy for open access." However, most of these developments and critiques have been framed within the cost-benefit approach, under
the efficiency rationality assumption. Also, most of this work considers that,
unless an interest group pushes the government otherwise, the cost-benefit approach may prevail in the creation of property (either individual or common
property).'

The hypothesis of this Article is that even when it seems efficient to create
property rights, and there is no interest group pressing for a denial to grant such

rights, this may not always occur. The Article explores internal and external
causes, different from efficiency, which may influence the dynamic for the rise
of property rights. Among the internal causes, this Article will refer to the interaction of efficiency rationality with psychological constraints and cultural
norms. Among the external causes, this Article will discuss the role of the State"
in transforming social property norms into legal property rights.
To test the hypothesis mentioned above, this Article analyzes the case of
land and water management in a shantytown in Lima, the capital of Peru. The
name of the town is "Villa Lourdes Ecologico II" ("Villa Lourdes"). It is located
within a larger area called Villa Maria del Triunfo, compounded by 280 other
shantytowns in the outskirts of Lima." Surrounded by desert-like hills and fog,
Villa Lourdes is one of the most distant towns in Villa Maria del Triunfo. Almost at the top of one of the hills, the town is mostly populated by urban aboriginals from the Peruvian Highlands, with 465 houses, no water grid, and no
sewage system." The town, like most shantytowns in Lima, began as an invasion

19.
20.
21.

Id. at 347-48, 350.
Id. at 348-49, 354-55.
Id at 349, 354-57.

22. Sce ELLICKSON, ORDER, supranote 10, at 167-83; OSTROM, supra note 7, at 15-18; Saul
Levnore, Two Stoies About the Evolution ofPropertin'Jghts,31 J. LEGAL Su). S421, S433-

50 (2002).
23. See ELLICKSON, ORDER, supia note 10, at 4; sec OsTROM, supia note 7, at 8-15.
24. See Epstein, supia note 13, 217-18; see also Heniy E. Smith, Exclusion Veisus Goveinance: Two Strategies for DelincatingPropetwRights,31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S464 (2002).
25. See Levmore, supia note 22, at S432-33; Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in
Property Rights Systems: The Thind World Tagedy of ContestedAccess, 115 YALE L. 996,
1042 (2006).
26. When we refer to "State" or "Government" in this Article we refer to the Peruvian Central Government The executive branch of the Peruvian government has three layers, the central
government, regional governments, and local governments. In case we refer to a layer different
from the Peruvian Central Government, such differentiation will be noted.
27. Asentainiento Hunano Villa de Lourdes ILol6gico (Sept. 21, 2015), http://villadelour
desii.blogspot.comn.
28. SceJose Vadillo Vila, Gaicnafotogriica:Frio en las altuas de Villa Maria dl Triunfo,
Andina (Jul. 12, 2016), http://andina.pe/agencia/noticia.aspx?id-620915.
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on public land in 2005. Since then, the government has not intervened, for
better or for worse, in the area. 9
Because Villa Lourdes does not have a water grid, or any kind of water
system provided by the State, residents have to buy water in the private market.
Moreover, because of Villa Lourdes' location, acquiring water can be significandy more expensive than buying it in Lma.'
In 2004, however, Abel Cruz, the leader of the "Peruanos Sin Agua" association," developed a mechanism to farm the fog. He named the system
"atrapanieblas" ("fog catchers"). Pernanos Sin Agua has been installing this
technology around different foggy areas in Peru, Villa Lourdes being one of
them. Surprisingly though, Peruanos Sin Agua has encountered a lack of engagement for fog farming at Villa Lourdes.
After visiting Villa Lourdes and Peruanos Sin Agua facilities, and interviewing Abel Cruz and Vicente Chavez, the latter being one of the founders of Villa
Lourdes, it seems that Villa Lourdes has partially followed the cost-benefit account with regards to land and has not at all in respect to fog fanning. Residents
of Villa Lourdes prefer to keep paying high prices for water instead of engaging
in fog farming. Moreover, the interaction among social property norms, legal
property rights, and the State shows how the inability of transforming social
property norms into legal property rights may underscore Villa Lourdes' residents, being a gridlock for poverty and social segregation (altogether, the "Fog
Catchers case").
The Fog Catchers case reflects a stage at the human-natural resources spectrum that has been defined by Daniel Fitzpatrick as "contested access,"2 supposedly reflecting a unique tension between social norms and legal property
rights in Third World countries. However, this Article also draws parallels to
comparable stories in developed countries, such as the United States, Germany,
and Australia, showing that contested access, as with any property tragedy, can
be everywhere.
Hence, in this Article, Section I will revisit the cost-benefit approach in
property theory, setting the structural framework to analyze the above mentioned hypothesis. Section II will depict the Fog Catchers case, narrating what
was found during the field work in relation to property, explaining how the residents of Villa Lourdes manage land and water, identifying the parties that are
involved in the case, and recognizing what the role of the government is in this
story. Section III will re-examine why the cost-benefit approach is not enough
to explain the Fog Catchers case. Section IV will go beyond the cost-benefit
approach, exploring internal and external factors that intervene in the rise and
interaction between social property nonns and the legal system. Section V will

29.

See David Blanco Bonilla, Mi "atrapanieb/as" damn agua a liihas del sur de Jima

(Feb. 16, 2015, 9:59 AM), http://rpp.pe/linma/ctualidad/mil-atrapanicblas-daran-agua-a-faniliasdel-sur-dc-liima-noticia-769729 (noting th ththe fog-catching project depends on sponsorship by
collaborating private companies).

3 0.

Id.

31. See MOVlMIENTO PERUANOS SIN AGUA, http://ww.lossinagua.org/nosotros.htnl/ (last
visited Aug. 24, 2017).
32. Fitzpatiick, supra note 25, at 1046-47.
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give a brief account of why Fitzpatrick's contested access theory does not only
apply to developing countries, and why his account of legal pluralism and the
role of the state in developing countries needs to be reviewed. Finally, the Article will conclude with a brief overview of the findings of the preceding sections.
I. THE RISE OF PROPERTY AND THE COST-BENEFIT APPROACH
Law and economics have shaped modern property theory. The initial foundations for such a trend were based on Ronald Coase's 1960 article "The Problem of Social Cost,"' Harold Demsetz' 1967 "Toward a Theory of Property
Rights,"' and Garrett Hardin's 1968 "The Tragedy of the Commons."'
Ronald Coase's "Coase Theorem" explains why entitlements are transferred, and when these transfers are efficient. In the "Problem of Social Cost,"
Coase proposes that when transaction costs are zero, it does not matter where
the entitlement is placed; the party who values the good more will end up acquiring it.' When transaction costs exist, it becomes necessary to review where
the entitlement is placed. Transaction costs can block the transaction. Hence,
the legal system needs to ensure that the entitlement is given to the person that
values it most
Under Coase's view, transfer of rights will depend on a cost-benefit analysis.
Assuming that people are driven by an efficiency rationale, if the benefits are
higher than the costs, then the transaction will go through.1 Transaction costs
can increase the costs and block the transfer; that is why, in a world of existing
transaction costs (the case of virtually any transaction), the initial assignment of
the entitlement needs to be carefully made.
Coase makes a very important assumption: the entitlement has to be initially placed by a central government.' This follows the logic of Hobbes' and
Locke," in the sense that a centralized force, which has monopoly over power,
needs to exist for property rights to emerge." In the case of Hobbes, that centralized force will be the leviathan that assigns the entitlement to design the system. In the case of Locke, it will be the government which recognizes and secures the mix of labor and resources that is performed by the private parties.
Many property authors have revisited these antagonistic views." As Carol Rose
puts it, we can see them as top-down or bottom-up creation of property rights

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See gcnerally Coase, supra note 5.
Se gcncrally Dernsez, supma note 6.
Sec generally Hardin, supra note 1.
See Coase, supra notc 5, at 6.
Sec id. at 40-42.
See id. at 8.
THOMAS HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1968) (1651).

40.

JOHN

LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.

Press 1988) (1690).
41. Krier, supra note 17, at 139, 149-50.
42.

OSTROM, supra note 7, at 8-15; ELUCKSON, ORDER, supla note 10, at 2, 4; Carol M.

Rose, What Goveim'nents can do for Property (and Vice Versa), in THE

FUNDAMENTAL

INTERRELATIONSHIPs BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209,210-12 (Nicholas Mercuro

& Warren J. Samuels eds., Jai Press Inc. 1999).
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regimes." However, Coase does not develop a theory to explain when these
rights are created, nor does he take a clear position as to a top-down or bottomup approach.
Demsetz, on the other hand, attempts to build a theory, from a bottom-up
perspective, that explains when property rights are created. Using the example
of beaver hunting by native Indians of the present-day Quebec region, he concludes that social norms similar to property will rise when the costs of excluding
intruders are less than the benefits of doing so.' Demsetz incorporates Coase's
cost-benefit approach from the transferring of rights to the creation of them,
assuming that people will act based on an elliciency rationale.
Demsetz considers that creating a property regime under his cost-benefit
approach will allow individuals to internalize all costs and gains, eliminating
common-pool losses.' Demsetz true meaning was that private property will be
the cure for Hardin's tragedy of the commons, even though he did not call these
common-pool losses "tragedy of the commons." Hardin's tragedy of the commons label came one year after in 1968 with his "Tragedy of the Commons"
article. Hardin's thesis states that commons will bring "ruin to all," damaging
resources by over-consumption or over-pollution.'
While Demsetz seems to prefer a bottom-up property regime, he is not as
clear as Coase as to what will be the role of the government. He does not have
an account of private orderings, nor one of government recognition in Locke's
terms. Hardin seems to prefer the top-down way of limiting the commons,
suggesting governmental intervention."
Up to this point, property theory mainly focused on two "only" solutions
and on only two poles of the human-resource management spectrum.' The
two "only" solutions were the Hobbesean and Lockean views, meaning government intervention for the design or recognition of property regimes. On the
other hand, the two poles of the spectrum were private property and open access. Thus, a second wave of property scholars came to question these views
first with Terry Anderson and Pj. Hill," and then more emphatically Elinor
Ostrom" and Robert Ellickson."
According to Anderson and Hill, historically we can see the cost-benefit
approach, but with a limited open access in the middle. Civilizations will progressively increase their enforcement of rights from non-enforcement to communal enforcement, and eventually to individual enforcement." However, Anderson and Hill do not explain how communal enforcement will work, and

43.
44.

See Rose, supra note 42.
Densetz, supra note 6, at 350-53.

45. Id. at 350.
46.
47.
48.
49.
ofthe
50.
51.
52.

Hardin, supia note 1, at 1244-45.
Id. at 1245-46.
OSTROM, supa note 7, it 8-15.
Sec gcneialvTerry L. Anderson & PJ. Hill, TheEvolution ofPrvpenv]?ights:A Study
Ameriican Wcst 18J. OF L. & ECON. 163, 164-68 (1975).
See generallyOSTROM, supra note 7.
Sec genenalyELLICKSON, ORDER, supra note 10.
See Anderson & Hill, supranote 49, at 167-68.
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whether this limited open access or common property mechanism could actually be efficient.
Ostrom and Ellickson dive deeply into this problem-the former from the
economic arena, and the latter from the legal field-claiming that private orderings can be efficient, and have shown to be efficient, within a close-knit group.5
Thus, both authors consider private orderings, on the outskirts of the legal system, as viable solutions for the management of natural resources. They both
include common property (referred by Ostrom as common-pool resources"
and by Ellickson as limited comnmons') within the spectrum of human-natural
resource management. Moreover, Ostrom and Ellickson consider that there is
not an "only" solution. Both authors agree on an interaction between the legal
system and social norms.5 Sometimes, the government will either assign the
right or transform the social norm into a legal right; at other times, the social
norm will pacifically exist on the outskirts of the legal system. Efficiency rationality is at the base of Ostrom's and Ellickson's analysis as well." They apply the
cost-benefit approach but include common property and private orderings in
the equation. In the case of Ellickson, however, he adds an analysis of the social
interactions between the parties that will create the private orderings.
A third milestone in the evolution of cost-benefit property theory came in
Henry Smith's 2002 article "Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights."" In the article, Smith discusses why private property may or may not be preferred over common property. He considers the
view held by Demsetz, Anderson, and Hill-that having private property as the
final goal-is relative. Smith expresses the need to reread the cost-benefit approach including all the marginal costs and gains of creating exclusionary rights.
The result of this is that sometimes private property will be the answer, when
the proxy of access is preferred, and sometimes it will be common property,
when the proxy of use is preferred.5 ' However, Smith considers that the initial
form of property will be shown as a rough, "low-precision" way of exclusion,"
which will then evolve into a well-defined government or a more "fine grained"
private property.
Over the years, there have been some important complementary views that
are worth mentioning. Such is the case of Gary D. Libecap's 1989 book ContractingforPioperlylights."Libecap uses the efficiency rationality assumption,

53. Sec OSTROM, supra note 7, at 15-18; ELLICKSON, ORDER, supla note 10, at 167-83.
54. OSTROM, supia note 7, at 30.
55. See Robert Ellickson, Propertn
j Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315, 1398 (1993) [hereinafter
Ellickson, Property).
56. See generally OSTROM, supra note 7, at 8-15; see general Ellickson, Property, supa
note 55, at 1320-21.
57. See generally OSTROM, supma note 7, at 1-18; ELLUCKSON, ORDER, supra note 10, at 8;
and Ellickson, Propelty supm note 55, at 1319-20.
58. See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Govemance: Two Strategies for Dchoneating PropertyRights, 31 J. OF LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).

59. Se id at S464-78.
60. Id. at S485.
61.
62.

Id. at S486.
See gencrallyLIBECAP, supranote 9.
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and agrees generally with the cost-benefit approach.' However, he includes the
role of the government as a decisive gate to transform social property norms to
legal property rights." Libecap narrates the cases of mining, management of
federal land, fisheries, and oil, to show how sometimes the legal system will
accept the privates' claims, and sometimes it will reject them. It is true, though,
that Libecap seems to suggest that if and when granting legal rights is efficient,
legal property rights are more likely to be created.'
Levmore takes this concept further in his 2002 article, "Two Stories About
He includes the interaction of interest
the Evolution of Property Rights."
groups in the formation of property rights and considers that the cost-benefit
approach may or may not prevail in the evolution of property rights, because
interest groups may influence the government to obtain a result that is not efficient.' Fitzpatrick's 2006 article "Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access" also considers that the
cost-benefit approach may be broken when governmental intervention opposes
private orderings."
Thus, the cost-benefit approach is still characterized as the driver of property evolution. However, this may not be effective when interest groups lobby
the central power to obtain an inefficient result on their own behalf resulting in
rising social property norms will not be transformed into legal property rights."
Section II below tests this understanding of the cost-benefit approach in the
Fog Catchers case, then summarizes the findings in Section III. The initial hypothesis is that the cost-benefit approach will not always result in the creation of
property, even when no interest group is pressing to bar this result.

II. THE FOG CATCHERS CASE: VILLA LOURDES
The present section refers to the field work at Villa Lourdes and the associated background; it narrates the interviews, visits, and findings. The case study
shows that, contrary to what the cost-benefit approach should foresee, no legal
property right has been granted over the land the residents of Villa Lourdes
hold, and no social property norm has evolved over the fog.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE STUDY
Abel Cruz was contacted for the first time on February 14, 2017," after a
video was released by the BBC" about the Fog Catchers and Peruanos Sin
Agua. The video showed the fog catchers as a possible way to overcome the
63.

Id.at 12-14.

64. Id.at115.
65. Il. at 13.
66. Id. at 14.
67.

See gcncialv Levmore, supia note 22, at S421-23.

68.

Id. at S423-33.

69. Fitzpatrick, supma note 25, at 1041-42.
70. See Levmore, supra note 22, at S423-33; see Fitzpatrick, supra note 25, at 1042.
71. Email interviews of Abel Cruz (May 15, 2017).
72. The log catcherwho bings water to the poor, BBC (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/av/magazine-38175202/the-fog-catcher-who-brings-water-to-the-poor.
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lack of water in Peruvian shantytowns. We visited Abel Cruz at the offices of
Peruanos Sin Agua in Lima, Peru, on June 2, 2017.
After interviewing Abel," we visited Villa Lourdes, a shantytown in which
Peruanos Sin Agua had installed fog catchers. There we were to meet Vicente
Chavez, one of the founders of the town. Once we arrived at Villa Maria del
Triunfo, the paved road rapidly became a muddy trail, and the clean air transformed into heavy fog. We had to use a four-wheel-drive truck because of the
mud and the slippery road. Skirting cliffs, we reached Villa Lourdes, and then,
at the top of the hill, the area where the fog catchers were.
We interviewed Vicente.7 He showed us the town and the fog catchers.
He explained to us that the fog catchers were.no longer being used because they
needed to reinstall the nets, and the community of Villa Lourdes did not want
to engage in the needed work. Because of the fog, it was almost impossible to
see at the top of the hill. The deserted hill had become green due to the fog.
We were in the best season for fog fanning, but Villa Lourdes was not doing it.
They had all the technology and tools at hand, but the nets were down and no
water was runmng.
We contacted Vicente and Abel on several occasions to ask them further
questions about the research." When we called Vicente on August 19, 2017,`
the nets were still down. The high fog season in Lima goes from the end of
May to the end of October, with June, July, and August being the foggiest
months. Time was up.
In contrast to the fog catchers, land management in Villa Lourdes was working fine. Even though the town did not have any State presence or public services, the town had organized to provide these services for themselves. Vicente
and Abel explained to us how the town association was organized to work in
common areas, police the town, and solve conflicts." However, none of the
residents had legal property rights or land titles over their houses.
'

B. SHANTYTOWNS IN LIMA

Shantytowns in Lima have a long tradition and a quite homogenous story.
A group of migrants, especially rural or urban aboriginals from the Peruvian
highlands, organize to squat on unoccupied public land. This process has been

73. Interview of Abel Cruz, Peruanos Sin Agua's Office, in Chorrillos, Peru (June 2, 2017).
74. Interview of Vincente Chavez, at Villa Lourdes Ecologico II site (June 2, 2017).
75. Email and telephone interviews of Abel Cruz (May 15, 2017, and August 22, 2017); Telephone interviews of Vicente Chavez (June 13, 2017, August 19, 2017, and August 22, 2017).
76. Telephone interview of Vicente Chavez (August 19, 2017).
77. Telephone interview of Abel Cruz (August 22, 2017); in-person and telephone interviews
of Vicente Chavez, at Villa Lourdes Ecologico II site (June 2, 2017, and August 22, 2017). It is
important to note that the town does have public lights and electricity. However, according to
both Abel and Vicente, this is due to the association's own organization. kl. They agreed with
the electric company to buy the needed infrastructure to be provided with electricity. The residents of Villa Lourdes pay an extra fee in their electricity invoices, which includes the price of the
electric infrastructure.
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duly documented by Peruvian authors like Hernando de Soto" and Richard
Webb."
Peru is quite a centralized country, and Lima is seen by migrants as the city
of opportunities. But when migrants arrive in Lima, they do not have a place
to live. Buying a piece of land or a house inside the city is beyond their budget.
Thus, people go to the outskirts of the city, surrounding the capital of Peru by
what has been called a "misery-belt.""
This process started in the 1940s, and since then, Peru and Lima's demography has changed radically." First, Peru's population has grown tremendously
from 1940 to the present. According to a national census run by the Peruvian
government, Peru had 7,023,000 people in 1940; in 1981, 17,762,000; in 2007,
28,221,000." Peru is running a new national census by the end of 2017, and
the expected population for 2016 was 31,489,000 people."
This population growth paralleled a high migration rate from the Peruvian
highlands to the coast. The Peruvian territory is divided by coast (Costa), highlands (Sierra), and jungle (Selva). In 1940, most of the population was located
in the Andean highlands, where most rural aboriginals have lived since time
immemorial-Cusco having been the capital of the Inca Empire, the ruling aboriginal civilization before the Spanish conquest on the 1500s." Figure I shows
how this population distribution dramatically reversed according to the national
censuses of 1940, 1961, 1972, 1981, 1993, and 2007. While the coast and the
highlands exchanged positions, the jungle remained the most unpopulated region.

78. HERNANDO DE SoTo, EL OTRO SENDERO (Instituto Libertad y Democracia, 6th ed.
1987) [hereinafter OTRO SENDEROl; HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) [hereinafter MYSTERY OF CAPITAL].
79. See RICHARD WEBB ET AL., LA CONsTRUCCION DEL DERECHO DE PROPIEDAD (2006).
80. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 75

(Harper Perenniad 1989) (1973).

8 1.

Id.

82. INsTrrUTo NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA E INFORMATICA, PERU SINTEls ESTADIS7I(A
201611 (2016).

83.

Id.

84.

HOW ARD ERLICHMAN, CONQUEST, TRIBUTE, AND TRADE, 160-63 (Prometheus Books

2010).
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Among the cities on the coast, most of the migration came to Lima. According to Hernando de Soto, between 1940 and 1981 Lima's number of migrants, or migrant descendants, grew 6.3 times, from 300,000 to 1,900,000."
Thus, Lina's population grew from 630,173 in 1940 to 8,445,211 in 2007,'7 and
has an expected population in 2016 of 9,986,000 people.'
As said by E.F. Schumacher in his 1973 book, Smallis BeautTul
As an illustration, let me take the case of Peru. The capital city, Lima, situated
in the Pacific Coast, had a population of 175,000 in the early 1920s, just fifty
years ago. Its population is now approaching three million. The once beautiful

"

Spanish city is now infested by slums, surrounded by misery-belts that are
crawling up the Andes. People are arriving from the rural areas at the rate of
one thousand a day - and nobody knows what to do with them. 9

The high migration rates, together with the lack of action from the government, brought a flood of land invasions, and the creation of many shantytowns
with no legal rights or formal property tides (i.e., informal property). Such was
the case that, in 1982, housing in Peru was distributed as follows: 8.2 percent
slums, 42.6 percent informal housing, and 49.1 percent formal housing." In

85.

INsTITUTo NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA E INFORMATICA, PERU: SINTEsis ESTADISTICA

2016 STATISTICAL SUMMARY 12 (2016), https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/publica
ciones-digitales/Est/Libl391/libro.pdf.
86.

OTRO SENDERO, supra note 78, at 8.

87.

Evoluci6n de la poblaci6n censada uhana, segrin depauainento y afdo censal, data

spreadsheet of Poblaci6n y Vienda, INSTITtfTo NACIONAL DE EsTADISTICA E INFORMATICA,

lttps://www.ini.gob.pe/cstadisticas/indice-tematic/poblacion-y-vivicndla/
2018)

Ihereinafter

(last visited Mar. 27,

ESTADISTICA E INFORMATICAI.

88.

Id. at 16.

89.

E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALLIS BEAUTIFUI- ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATERED 75 (First

Perennial Library ed., 1989).
.

90.

INSITUTo NACIONA. DE ESTADISTICA E INFORMATICA, La Vtivcnda Informa, PERU

ESTADISTICAS DEL SECTOR INFORMAL, http://provectos.inci.gob.pc/web/bibioincipub
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2007, only 65.9 percent of housing in Peru had legal property titles, and, in
Lirna, only 75.9 percent."
Because immigrants built informal housing outside the boundaries of the
law, no public services were implemented by the government. As the shantytowns age, the representatives of the towns try to press for the implementation
of services, but the process is quite slow and, most of the time, ineffective."
Such was the case that in the last national census, of the 8,445,211 people living
93
in Lima, 1,526,234 did not have access to water.
C. VILLA LOJRDES

Its citizens founded Villa Lourdes in 2005." Following the narrative explained in Section II.B above, it began as an invasion of unoccupied public
land." The residents organized, divided the land, and assigned individual plots
to families. ' Villa Lourdes area is thirty-two hectares; sixteen are assigned to
households and sixteen to agriculture." The town currently has 465 households, each of which has an average of four people, which gives an approximate
number of 1,860 residents." Each household plot has another 200-meter plot
for farming, located in the area assigned for agriculture." The fog catchers and
fog farming takes place in the area assigned to agriculture. Because this area is
at the top of the hill, it is the best suited spot to catch fog.
On August 2017, when the research field work for this Article ended, the
government had not installed any public services in Villa Lourdes." In its
twelve years of existence, current congressmen and other politicians have come
to visit the town,"' and have promised to implement public services; however,
they have not honored their word. As Vicente explained, "no politician fulfills
their promises, it is all words.".. Such is the case in the thirty-three surrounding

/bancopub/Est/Lib0 166/cl 51.HTM (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
91. ESTADiSTICA E INFORMATICA, supra note 87, Hogares en

viviendas propiaspor con-

cici6n dc tenencia de titlo de propiedad, scgin departainento.
92. According to Abel and Vicente, Villa Lourdes was created in 2005 and as of now they,
together with thirty-four other shantytowns in Villa Maria del Triunfo, do not have access to water.
Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 74; Interview with Abel Cruz, supra note 73.
93.

INsTITUTo NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA E INFORMATICA, PERU: MAPA DEL DFImCIT DE

AGUA Y SANEAMIENTO BASICO A NIVEL DIsTRITAL 20 (2010) https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/publicacionesdigitales/Est/LibO867/libro.pdf.
94. Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 74.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jd.

100. Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 74; Telephone Interview with Vicente Chavez,
supra note 75; Telephone Interview with Abel Cruz, supra note 75; see Telephone interview of
Vicente Chavez, supra note 77 (referring to public electricity).
101. According to Vicente, Susana Higuchi, ex-wife of the foniier Peruvian president Alberto
Fujinori, and mother of the forner runner-up of the last presidential election, Keiko Fujimori,
has come to the town, and walked all the way up to the top of the hill. Interview with Vicente
Chavez, supranote 74. Among other congressmen, Leyla Chihuan, from the same political party
as Ms. Fujimori, has visit Villa Lourdes. Id.
102. "Ningfn politico cumple lo que dicen, son puro floro." Interview with Vicente Chavez,
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Lourdes.."

*

*

It is hard to make the residents compromise in general. They need
incentives such as sodas and food to convince them to come to reinstall the nets.'"
The residents expect to obtain everything for free, just as they received the fog catchers. 3' Hence, they hope the government or a
private actor will come and assume the corresponding work to reinstall the nets.
F. PRIVATE PARTIES INVOLVED
1. The Residents of Villa Lourdes

The people of Villa Lourdes are mainly urban aboriginals from the Peruvian highlands.'" By urban aboriginals, we refer to people who are indigenous
to the Peruvian highlands but have adapted to live in the city and have become
part of the city's economic market. Many of the people included in this group
were, however, born in the rural areas or are descendants of rural aboriginals
that were not fully integrated into a capitalistic economy.'" A considerable
amount of the population of Villa Lourdes migrated from Cusco and is the first
generation to live in Lima.`
Most of the adults living in Villa Lourdes are laborers who work in Lima
city.'" They mostly work at construction sites, the Callao port, or for cleaning
services.'" Most of these people have a very tight budget and work every day to
put food on their tables."' Savings, thus, become quite hard to accumulate.
Because of where Villa Lourdes is located, most of the residents that work
must travel around two and a half hours to their jobs.'" People start leaving the
town between 4:00 and 6:00 in the morning and return home between 9:00 in
the evening and 2:00 in the morning.' They usually have at least one day of
rest during the week in which they do not work, but this can be quite variable.'"
A small portion of the population is dedicated to agriculture, especially
older men and women who do not work in the city. However, this activity is
restrained by the availability of water."' These farmers grow lettuce, onions, and
potatoes among other crops."' They consume what they produce and do not
typically sell their products as an alternative economic activity.'"
129.
130.

Interview with Vicente Chavez, supm note 74.
Interview with Abel Cruz, supra note 73.

131.

Id.

132.

Telephone Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 75.

133. Id.
134.
135.

Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 74.
Telephone Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 75.

136.

Id.

137.

Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 74.

138.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.

141.
142.

Telephone Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 75.
Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 74.

143.

Telephone Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 75.

139.
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2. Peruanos Sin Agua
Peruanos Sin Agua is a non-profit organization focused on bringing water
to the people who do not have it.'" Abel Cruz, its founder, was born in Cusco
and lived there until his adulthood. He moved to Lima in search of a better
life." Following the narrative explained in section II.B, he ended up living in a
shantytown in Lima, located in the district of Ancon. He did not have water for
his plot of land and had to buy it from a water tanker every week until he came
up with the idea of the fog catchers." The fog catchers are one of Peruanos Sin
Agua main products and are primarily financed by international aid, public
funds, and private entities."
G. STATE ROLE

The Peruvian central government has two main roles in relation to Villa
Lourdes. First, Villa Lourdes depends on the State to recognize or deny the
residents rights over the land and fog that they may possess. Second, the State
is responsible for providing public services to Villa Lourdes."
With respect to the recognition of the residents' land rights, Villa Lourdes
began as an occupation of public land." Legally, the people do not have any
legal right to occupy or use the land, similar to many shantytowns. The State
can either recognize or deny the residents' possession of the land. If the government recognizes their possession, the State should give legal property rights
and formal titles to the residents. If the government does not recognize the
residents' possession of the land, the State could evict the residents from their
houses.
As a natural resource, fog is currently considered a State-owned resource
and a public good.' Natural resources, such as fog, a lake, or the sea, are all
public goods."' Because of how the Peruvian constitutional system is structured,
unless the government says the contrary, these public goods can be used by
anyone. Because there is no regulation in place limiting the access and use of
fog, nobody's access or use can be excluded. However, being a State-owned
resource, the government could regulate its access and use.
If the government recognizes the possession and rights of the people over
Villa Lourdes' land, it should install the basic public services required to inhabit
the town. Among these services, water access and sewage are essential.
With respect to fog farming, fog is currently considered a State-owned resource. Currently, anyone can use fog and nobody can be excluded. Hence,
144.

MOVIMIENTO PERUANOS SIN AGUA, http://www.lossinagua.org/ (last visited Mar. 27,

2018).
145. Interview with Abel Cruz, supla note 73.
146. Ad.
147. Id.; Telephone Interview with Abel Cruz, supla note 75.
148. Interview with Abel Cruz, supra note 73; Telephone Interview with Abel Cruz, supia
note 75.
149. Interview with Abel Cruz, supa note 73; Telephone Interview with Abel Cruz, supra
note 75.
150. See CoNsTrrucION PoliTICA DEL PERtl ICONsTITUTION Dec. 29, 1993, art. 66.

151. Id.
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fog is presently considered an open access, without specific regulation. However, because fog is a State-owned resource, the government could regulate its

use in the future.
The current status of the State's activity is of toleration and mere inaction.
The government has neither rejected nor endorsed the rights of the people in
Villa Lourdes, either in the case of land possession or fog use. Also, it has not
installed a water grid to provide water or a sewage system. The government has
left Villa Lourdes alone, forcing the residents to make up for the State's lack of
action by creating their own private ordering. However, because the government is empowered to make a decision regarding either resource, it can do so
any at time. If it decides to do so, such decision will bring important consequences to the people of Villa Lourdes. The government could expel people
from their houses, and it could prohibit fog farming. Until either decision is
made, people in the town live in limbo.
Nonetheless, the local government of Villa Maria del Triunfo, a district
which was historically built based on invasions, signaled some recognition of the
rights of Villa Lourdes residents. The main strategy for local governments is to
give the inhabitants of the shantytowns tiles of possession. These tides do not
render legal property rights to tenants. However, the tiles recognize the tenants
as possessors of the land and consider that they have the right to be there.
Possession tides are a form of "grey" tile because the disposal of public
land depends on the central government.` However, socially these tides have
an important value. As referenced in Section I.B, invasions and shantytowns
have an important tradition and historical background in Peru, and it is unusual
to see the government evicting land possessors.' Such is the case that microfinance institutions accept possession tides as collateral for giving loans."' The
social recognition, however, does not erase the government's executive powers
to evict the Villa Lourdes residents.
H. SUMMARY: RESOURCES INVOLVED AND THEIR CURRENT TREATMENT

1. Land
Although it would be efficient, and no interest group is pressing to bar the
granting of rights, no one at Villa Lourdes has a legal property right or formal
property tide. However, the residents organized the land, dividing it into individual plots assigned to each family. Each household receives a plot of land in
the housing area, and another in the agricultural area. In the housing area, the
founders of the town made provisions for roads that would connect the individual plots of land. In the agricultural area, they also made provisions for connecting roads and common areas to be dedicated in the future to a tourist complex. 55

152.
14.2(a),
153.
154.

155.

Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Bienes Estaales, Law No. 29151 it II, ch. II, art
Julio 14, 2014, DIARIO OFICIL D.O.l (Peru).
See gencrallyOTRO SENDERO, supra note 78, at 35-36.
Interview with Vicente Chavez, supra note 74.
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The land tenure of the residents at Villa Lourdes is based on possession
and social recognition. Thus, they are organized by a neighbors' association,
which is in charge of deciding and managing the common goods of the town,
resolving conflicts among neighbors, and protecting the town. Villa Lourdes
residents enforce their possession right privately, assigning people to police the
town. This defense is not only to protect the residents from thieves, but also to
protect the town itself from eviction by the government.'"
2. Water
Villa Lourdes does not have a public water grid to provide the residents
with water. Instead, the residents of Villa Lourdes must buy water from water
tankers, paying higher prices depending on how high the house that will acquire
the water is. The price of water in Villa Lourdes can be more than ten times
more expensive than the price of water in Lima."
Fog catchers could be an alternative to satisfy a considerable portion of the
water demand at Villa Lourdes. It would be efficient, and no interest group is
pressing to prevent it. Yet, the people of Villa Lourdes have not engaged in fog
farming.
III. WHY IS THE COST-BENEFIT APPROACH INSUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN
THE FOG CATCHERS CASE?
According to the cost-benefit approach, property rights will emerge when
the benefits of excluding third parties overcomes the costs of doing so.'" When
reviewing the Fog Catchers case, however, no legal property right has been created over land, and a social practice around fog farming has not even been developed. The cost-benefit approach would predict that the residents of Villa
Lourdes will create a combination of private and common property over land
and common property over fog. Because there are no interest groups lobbying
against the enforcement of these social property nonus, we would expect the
social norms to transform into legal rights. However, this has not happened.
In the case of land, residents of Villa Lourdes have created a combination
of private and communal property, all under the umbrella of a private ordering
which is distinct and independent of the legal system. In both the housing and
agricultural areas, there are portions of individual property and communal
property. Residents divided and distributed the land at the foundation of Villa
Lourdes, leaving space for roads to interconnect the isolated islands of private
property and for common areas to be enjoyed by the different members of the
community. The roads and common areas are both subject to common property, or, in other words, to limited open access.
This case study differs from Ellickson's Shasta County study in the sense
that the people of Shasta County did have a legal entitlement to build over the

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 6, at 350-53.
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land - they had legal property rights.' However, as Ostrom and Ellickson considered, private ordering and collective actions work their way through to create
social order."
There are no interest groups opposing the transformation of Villa Lourdes'
social property norns into legal property rights. According to the cost-benefit
approach, in a circumstance like this, social property norms should become
legal property rights. Instead, the people of Villa Lourdes stay in a limbo of
legality. They have possessed their land for more than ten years; they feel and
act like owners but legally they are not. The residents of Villa Lourdes could
protect their land from outsiders and the State itself, should they ever be threatened with eviction, by using their private ordering system to replace the traditional role of the government.
With regard to fog farming, the cost-benefit approach will foresee the creation of a limited open access, as usually happens with water rights.'' Even
though fog is currently an open access resource, legally owned by the State,
people will likely engage in cooperative practices to distribute the free water they
can obtain from the fog. As explained in section II.F, the majority of urban
aboriginals that live in Villa Lourdes are migrants from the Peruvian highlands
trying to make it in Lima. This means that they have a poor household economy. In such circumstances, saving money is a good and necessary idea, and
people could save money by using fog catchers instead of paying for water.
However, the fog catchers are not being used by the people of Villa Lourdes
and, at least for this year, have been abandoned.
Since May 2017, the community was supposed to reinstall the fog catchers'
nets, but as of August 2017 they have not done so.'" In the case of fog, the
community has not even created a social property norn over it. Thus, there is
no social norm to be transformed into a legal property right. This outcome
does not mesh with the cost-benefit approach.
IV. BEYOND A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH IN PROPERTY: OF INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL FACTORS
The traditional account of property evolution goes from no right, to social
property norms based in possession, to legal property rights (i.e., either individual, communal, or a mixture of them)." The Fog Catcher case, however, has
not followed this predicted path. In this Section, we try to explain the Fog
Catchers case by analyzing internal (dynamics among efficiency rationality, psychological constraints and cultural paradigms) and external (principally, government intervention) factors that may impact the property creation process.
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A. LAND AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

An approach for understanding why people in Villa Lourdes do not have
any legal property right is to look at the relationship between the State and the
residents. Libecap'sm and Ackerman's" accounts in relation to property rights
and the government show the power and flexibility that judges have in the American Common Law. Combining this with Levmore's account," the conclusion
is that courts will most likely transform social property norms into legal property
rights when the social property norm fulfills the cost-benefit approach, and
when this does not collide with an influential interest group. This faculty creates
a bridge between the informal property and the legal system, leaving a door that
can be opened when new circumstances arise from the creation of legal entitlements.
This flexibility does not exist in the Peruvian Judiciary. Peru follows the
Civil Law tradition, where the boundaries of the Civil Code restrictjudges. Social property norms, without the Code's backing, will not be recognized as legal
property. Where a Common Law judge would probably grant the legal property right, a Civil Law judge overseeing an appealing case will opt for creating an
argument to not apply the legal rule (mostly a procedural mistake), without
granting any legal entitlement to the resident." Thus, in these cases, justice is
preserving the status quo. The resident remains possessor without any legal
right
This difference between the Peruvian Civil Law and the American Common Law system makes the former less welcoming for new situations of social
property. The legal system in these cases closes the door, equating the residents
to well-liked outlaws.
In countries like Peru, where only 53.5% of the population has legal property rights over their houses," the lack of instruments for implementing new
forms of property becomes a gridlock of poverty and social segregation. Even
though the Peruvian Constitution claims equality among all,"' the lawless residents live in a country with no State. It is not a problem of frozen capital, as
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stated by Hernando de Soto,' but a problem of dignity. For these people,
government is a constant thread and a distant hope.
B. FOG AND INTERNAL FACTORS
Buying water in Villa Lourdes can be ten times more expensive than buying
it in Lima. The maintenance work to reinstall the fog catchers' nets will take
the residents' one free day of the week.' The fog catchers could cover a substantive proportion of the town's demand of water. If the residents were driven
by the cost-benefit approach, then they would engage in fog fanning and would
collaborate in reinstalling the nets. However, this has not happened.
A possible explanation of the residents' lack of engagement is that they suffer from an optimistic bias.' As discussed in Section II.E, some of them have
indicated that they should wait for the government to install a water grid. They
consider that if they reinstall the fog catchers, the government will not come
because they will already have water. Other communities will benefit from the
government's action before them. This, however, seems to be quite improbable. Villa Lourdes is twelve years old, and the government has never installed
any public service in the town or in the surrounding thirty-one shantytowns.
Considering that one of these towns has not received aid during its three-decade
existence, the hope for State action is a very distant one.
Some claim that the residents possess a lack of self-control in general. This
The residents may want to commit
could be framed as bounded willpower.
to reinstalling the fog catchers, but, when their free day comes, they just do not
feel like showing up. This, however, does not seem right, because private ordering governs Villa Lourdes. The residents assume many communal endeavors, such as maintaining the roads or policing the boundaries of the village."
Another account considers that residents expect to get everything for free.
Thus, the residents' culture"' will constrain their ability to'engage in activating
the fog catchers again. Because of this, Peruanos Sin Agua needs to give out
free food and soda during the work, otherwise the residents will not come. This
statement seems shocking when considering that they are receiving the fog
catchers, and the water they will farm, for free.
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Revisiting what was said in Section II.F above, the residents are urban aboriginals who have never received much from anyone, especially from the government. They traveled to Lima to pursue a better life, often migrating with not
much in their pockets. This may influence how they see the intervention of a
foreign agent. They are used to doing everything themselves and may be suspicious of any free aid outside of their borders. The people of Villa Lourdes view
Peruanos Sin Agua and the fog catchers as outsiders. Hence, this disbelief towards outsiders' gifts may be playing a key role in the residents' lack of engagement.
The problem with fog fanning in Villa Lourdes may lie in a deficient understanding of the "mix of beliefs, practices, values, and institutions shared by
members of a society [Villa Lourdes]."'. In other words, Villa Lourdes residents' culture is deeply rooted in the social property norms for managing their
resources. To create a new social property norm over a new asset, as Peruanos
Sin Agua is trying in respect to fog, such norms need to comply with, and adapt
to the people's culture.
V. ABORIGINAI.S AND THE "THIRD WORLD": A NON-EXCLUSIVE STORY
OF LEGAL PLuRALISM
The reality is that Villa Lourdes has different rules from the rest of Peru.
The residents of Villa Lourdes, as with many other shantytowns and villages,
developed a private ordering to manage their resources and settle their disputes.
On the other hand, the Peruvian legal system has laws that will often times conflict with the social norms of Villa Lourdes. Hence, Peru lives within legal pluralism.
Fitzpatrick's 2006 article "Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems:
The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access" seems to suggest that legal
pluralism is an inadequate quality for a legal system.' In addressing the interaction between social norms and legal rights, he states that "[tihe internal
strength of some community property regimes-reinforced by repeat interactions, social insurance mechanisms, and internalization processes-ensures that
external imposition of property rights order only generates uncertain circumstances of legal and normative pluralism."'7 ' He also considers that this will
bring a "contested access," where no rules are clear, and people live in a socalled Hobbesian state of nature, or a real state of war.'" Considering that the
"contested access" is natural for developing countries, he affirms: "[wihen the
state lacks the money, moral authority, or coercive capacity to override local
institutions, the result will be legal and normative pluralism."''
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These statements need to be reviewed. It is true that one will find legal
pluralism in developing countries, as in the case of Villa Lourdes, but it is not
necessarily true that legal pluralism damages the legal system, nor that the government should want to "override" it, or that is a characteristic exclusive to developing countries. It is true that in some cases legal pluralism can develop into
conflict, but this does not make legal pluralism wrong per se.
Legal pluralism is natural whenever we find private orderings different from
the rules governed by the State. These social norms will be wealth maximizing,
as stated by Ellickson,'" or simply more suited to a determined group's culture
or likes. In both cases, the group will choose to be governed by the private
ordering because it gives them something that the legal rules will not provide.
These social norms need to be respected, and the lack of government awareness
will always bring pathological results. As Ellickson claims in the last paragraph
of his book Order withoutLiw, "[t]his last point can be generalized: lawmakers
who are unappreciative of the social conditions that foster informal cooperation
are likely to create a world in which there is both more law and less order.""
Thus, an affirmation such as "[wihen the state lacks the money, moral authority, or coercive capacity to override local institutions, the result will be legal
and normative pluralism[,]""' wrongfully suggests that governments should try
to overpower legal and normative pluralism. Trying to do so is exactly what
triggers a state of war. Governments need to understand groups' private orderings to then build bridges between informal property and the legal system.
Finally, this relation between social property norms and the legal system is
not exclusive to aboriginal groups, nor of developing countries. Robert Ellickson's case studies of Shasta County" and Lisa Bernstein's diamond market
case" are well-known examples of successful relationships between private orderings and the legal system in the United States. However, there are several
examples in developed countries where social norms will clash with legal rules.
To mention a few examples, we have the following:
*

Chumash people (California, United States): In the 1970s the Chumash people opposed the construction of a liquefied natural gas ter-

minal at Point Conception, near Little Cojo Bay, because they considered the area to be a sacred place.1

*

7

Pitantatijara people (Central desert, Australia): The people opposed
the publishing of religious iconography, myths, and rituals from the
Pitjantjatjara in Charles Mountford's 1976 book Nomads oftheAustralianDesert. "'

*

Cheyenne, Arapaho, Crow, Kiowa, and Lakota people (Wyoming,
United States): The above mentioned native groups clashed with avocational climbers at Devil's Tower.

In 1980, the native groups
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claimed that such area was a sacred place and should not be used by
the climbers.'"
*

.*

*

Zia Pueblo (New Mexico, United States): The Zia Pueblo people
sued New Mexico in 1994 because of the unauthorized use of one of
their sun symbols on the State's flag. The Zia Pueblo argued that the
sun symbol was based on a nineteenth-century ceramic pot that was
crafted by an anonymous potter from Zia Pueblo.'
Bulun Bulun (Australia): Johnny Bulun Bulun and his clan sued
R&T Textiles Pty Ltd. in 1997 because of the unauthorized use of
their clan's paintings.'9'
Bavarians (Bavaria, Germany): In the German process to phase out
nuclear power, shifting to renewables, power lines needed to go
through towns and villages in Bavaria. In 2015, complaints arose
from the inhabitants of the area, opposing the construction of such

lines. J,
*

Standing Rock (North Dakota, United States): In 2016, the Standing
Rock Sioux tribe opposed the construction of the Dakota Access
Pipeline in North Dakota, United States. The tribe argued that the
pipeline would cross sacred land that they have possessed from time
immemorial.'

These cases show how different contexts can bring conflict between social
property norms and the legal system, no matter how developed the country may
be. It seems that these norms will be related to a feeling of proprietorship over
culture, and the resources that are managed through social norms.'' As Michael
Brown said in his 2003 book Who owns Native Culture?, "the crux of this
problem does not lie in irreconcilable views of ownership, even where these
exist. It is instead a fundamental matter of dignity."'
CONCLUSION
The cost-benefit approach is a fundamental instrument to study the creation
and evolution of property rights. However, the Fog Catchers case shows that
this may be insufficient to deeply understand the human-natural resource relationship. The interaction of social norms, legal property rights, and the State
will be of main importance in this endeavor. The inability of the legal system
in transforming social property norms into legal property rights, understanding
the particularities of the former, will be a constant threat to the people that cur-
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rently live on the outskirts of the Law. Culture, and how it may shape the relationship between people and their resources, may be able to shift the balance,
avoiding or incentivizing the creation of property regimes.
Legal pluralism, and the tension between private orderings and the legal
system, is not an exclusive characteristic of developing countries or aboriginal
groups, nor is it necessarily negative for the legal system. It is a lack of understanding of the social norms by the State that creates dividing walls. Based on
the Fog Catchers case, it seems clear that we need more bridges rather than
walls.

